Reports of 1,800 incidents of counterfeit parts being used in military aircraft has recently alarmed the US Senate committee and highlighted to the industry the seriousness of the problem of fake components.
The US report suggested that 70%of these'military'counterfeits originated in China.
Perhaps more surprising was the suggestion that the UK supply chain was involved in 11%of the cases.
"The sheer number of notifications from the databases we monitor on a daily basis indicates that this is a growing issue that the industry ignores at its peril,"says John Macmichael,managing director of Solid State Supplies.
"The most common supply chain entry point is purchase from unknown or unverified sources,"says Macmichael.
It may seem unlikely that counterfeit parts are found in military designs despite all of the controls that are in place.But there are specific factors which the counterfeiters can take advantage of.
According to franchised component distributors,in the rare instances they do come across problems with counterfeits,it is typically in one of two scenarios:component obsolescence or buyers being unaware of,or ignoring,quoted lead times for products.
With the life cycles of certain semiconductor products getting much shorter,end-of-life components can be targets for the counterfeiters.
"Semiconductor companies spend a lot of time and money designing parts only to make them obsolete very quickly when new,improved versions come along,"points out David Zelkha,managing director of Luso Electronics.
In high-reliability applications in particular,substitute components of similar specification are rarely acceptable.
Even if a potential substitute part is found,it can take months to execute a qualification process.So buyers are forced to resort to sourcing components wherever they can.
"Customers often find they can't use the newer parts without redesigning their boards.This creates new opportunities for the counterfeiters,"says Zelkha.
Counterfeiting takes numerous forms but its most common in the semiconductor business because the components are of relatively high value.It is also notoriously difficult to distinguish rogue parts.It is easy to make one black plastic or ceramic package look much like another.
Another source is the chips that are discarded by manufacturers as not being within the quoted specification.Along with components returned by customers to their suppliers,these are finding their way into the supply chain.
In some instances,the labeling on component packaging is forged,giving false information about either the part number or the manufacturer's brand.Sometimes,it's simply a question of re-marking to infer a higher level of testing and reliability,for example labelling a part that meets JanX as being Jan TX compliant.
Incredibly,there have been examples of customers buying empty plastic packages with no silicon inside them.The US Senate report also identified an issue with socket-mounted components such as FPGAs being harvested from old printed circuit boards then re-sold as new.
The current economic climate doesn't help the situation either.Inventory is being managed very tightly and manufacturers will only place component orders when they have firm contracts.
"With semiconductor lead times averaging 12-16 weeks,and some parts out at 22 weeks,buyers may risk going to the grey market to plug an immediate shortage of product,or even to try to save money,ignoring the difference between price and cost-of-ownership,"says Adrian Elms,business development director at MSC-Gleichmann UK,"and nobody can afford to place counterfeit or empty packages on a PCB."
That's the problem so what can buyers do to minimise the risk of being sold counterfeit parts?
Buying from franchised distributors and insisting in provision of Certificates of Conformity offers some protection.
According to Macmichael,there are further steps distributors can take to protect against counterfeits by working towards AS5553,an international standard created in 2007,initially for the US aerospace industry.This defines the requirements,practices and methods to reduce counterfeit parts entering the supply chain.AS5553 requires that incoming goods are properly inspected,that traceability is maintained and that scrap and surplus product is properly disposed of.
It is a distributor's responsibility to ensure that its suppliers have robust procedures in place to prevent counterfeits entering the supply chain.
What if a company has no other alternative but to use some obsolete parts,can the risk of counterfeits be minimised?
There are a few simple checks that can at least minimise,if not eliminate the risk.
"Once a potential source has been identified,start with some basic research,"says Zelkha."Ask for the date code on the components then check the manufacturer's website to see when they became obsolete."
And don't be surprised if you are offered a 2007 product that became obsolete in 2003."This kind of thing happens all the time,the counterfeiters aren't always that smart,"says Zelkha.
"You can also ask for a scan of the bar code on the packaging and have that checked against the component manufacturer's records,"adds Zelkha.
Elms agrees and recommends that buyers always carry out a lot code check as a minimum precaution when buying on the grey market."The component manufacturers are normally quite helpful as they have a vested interest in stamping out counterfeiting too,"says Elms.
And if there is no choice but to use the grey market for those hard to source parts then it's still beneficial to go to a trusted supplier that can manage the risk of taking this route.
